I stepped into the booth,
Curtains closed behind me.
I recalled the manifesto and the rally I had seen.
It all seemed still, until
The blue ink touched my nail,
And I could taste democracy…
Isaac Newton’s third law of motion states that every action has an equal and opposite reaction; an Indian voter might defer to agree with this, for she still awaits a response. Democracy was meant to be a governance, of the people, for the people and by the people, but, with time, people’s existence has been reduced to a mere namesake. The essay delves into the interplay of political behaviour and the phenomenon of free-riding, collective action problems, and rational ignorance as the deciding factors for voters’ behaviour. Using the case of Uttar Pradesh in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the study investigates how these factors manifest themselves in one of India’s most electorally significant states, providing insights into voter rationality and the role of social identity in Indian democracy. Through this essay, we attempt to tread the psychological path of an Indian voter and uncover what goes behind the booth.
Background
The electoral system of India is carefully crafted and serves as the cornerstone of its vibrant democracy, ensuring the participation of citizens in choosing their representatives. If elections are to matter in a democratic society and live up to expectations, the methods employed to conduct them must be acceptable. Therefore, features such as universal adult franchise, multi-tiered electoral structure, constituency delimitation, reservation for marginalised groups and women, independent election commission, and a model code of conduct, have been adopted as part of the Indian electoral system.
India follows the first-past-the-post-system (FPTP), a British legacy, where votes translate into seats for a political party or independent candidates (Mahanand, 2019). The FPTP is the simplest, irrespective of the number of candidates contesting, whoever gets the most votes, wins, even if the margin is just one. Thereby, it is safe to assume that the winning candidate secures the support of only 20 per cent of the population in a constituency but is expected to represent the interests of all.
Apart from the FPTP system, another popular and successful electoral system was found to be the proportional representation system (PR), but the founding fathers of the Indian electoral system, including B. R. Ambedkar, rejected the PR system, as it was believed to lead the country towards fragmentation based on India’s numerous castes, languages, and regions (Mahanand, 2019). Mostly, people perceive that the electoral method is simply nothing but a voting method, where the election of a winner is decided (Ranney, 1993), but in a multi-caste, multi-religious, multi-lingual and highly diverse society like that of India, the electoral method becomes increasingly crucial.
Dynamics of Political Behaviour
When going out to a movie with a friend, who would you rather go out with, a) someone who matches your genre of movies but does not read movie reviews or knows about the latest hits, or b) someone who reads the movie reviews thoroughly but does not match with your preferences, or c) someone who picked out a movie for you once and you liked it? In other words, should you choose someone who carries similar preferences, or expertise, or someone with little track record of success?
This is the sort of dilemma every Indian voter goes through during elections. Rarely does one find all desirable qualities in one candidate and thus has to decide how to decide. Politics is a complex and dynamic sphere, which is driven by the actions, reactions and decisions of individuals within a society. Studying political behaviour involves the study of intricate mechanisms which influence the engagement of individuals, with and within the political landscape. Understanding these behaviours becomes important in comprehending good governance and societal progress. In this context, examining voters’ psychology becomes pivotal in not only deciphering the complexities of political behaviour, but also the dynamics of elections. It records the responses of citizens towards political stimuli, be it policies, parties, candidates, or broader socio-political issues. The insights gained from this study provide a critical framework to analyse and navigate through the ever-changing terrain of political engagement.
Paradox of Voting
In 1957, Anthony Downs, a simple economist, asked a simple question: “Why do people bother to vote if one vote almost never changes the result of big elections?”
This is where the paradox of voting coincides with the Sorites Paradox.
The Sorites paradox is based on the idea of vague terms which have unclear boundaries. For instance, the term, “heap,” does not have a clear definition as to how many grains of wheat make a heap. This paradox starts by saying that one grain is not enough to make a heap, similarly, two grains and so on, leading us to an absurd conclusion that no number of grains can make a heap, which is obviously untrue but the reasoning supports it (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018).
When this argument is run in the opposite direction, from the premise that one million grains make a heap, then reducing a single grain does not make a difference. This brings us to another absurd conclusion that even a single grain can make a heap. Thus, critical reasoning makes both situations seem plausible, bringing us to the conclusion that, a) no number of grains can make a heap, b) one grain is enough to make a heap.
Putting this in the electoral framework, if one vote does not make a difference, then no number of votes can make a difference. Tracking this in reverse, if a million votes make a difference then so does a single vote.
Collective Action Problem
Collective action problems are everywhere in the political arena. In classical economic theory, collective action problems are not seen as a natural condition. Classical economic theory holds that individuals will act to benefit themselves and that in doing so they will also benefit others through the “invisible hand”. This can be understood with the following example. There are two individuals, each having an apple and an orange. One individual really loves oranges; the other, apples.
When one person gives the other an apple and the other gives an orange, they both benefit even though neither person acted with the other's best interests in mind. Collective action logic comes to the opposite conclusion, one in which individuals acting in their own self-interest can have incentives that lead them to act in ways that harm not only the broader public but also each other. This is because they each have self-interested incentives to trade that which they care about less for that which they desire more (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018). Collective action problems manifest themselves in three ways, tragedy of the commons, the free riding, and the prisoner’s dilemma. “Tragedy of commons" is an economic problem wherein an individual exploits a common resource or “commons”, over which nobody has an exclusive claim, at the expense of the society. “Prisoner’s Dilemma” is a game theory thought experiment that involves two rational individuals separated by no means of communication. They can either cooperate for mutual benefit or betray each other for individual gain. “Tragedy of commons” is also a type of “Prisoner’s dilemma.” Here, the essay only aims to discuss the problem of “free-riders”.
Free riding can be best explained through memories of school assignments. Regardless of whether you worked tirelessly or did nothing at all, you would receive the same grade as everyone else in the group. However, doing nothing would mean giving up control over what that grade might be. This behaviour — benefiting without contributing — is known as the free rider problem. In small groups, free riding can be managed through peer pressure and the understanding that not contributing might harm the team's grade. But in the political world, groups are much larger, making free riding harder to detect and control.
The logic of free-riding poses significant obstacles to political change and complicates efforts to address policy issues. Political change is hard to achieve because it tends to favour the status quo. A column of the Freakonomics (Azar, 2006), asked why the economists do not believe in voting. Their answer was simple, the costs of this process outweighed the benefits. The costs being the loss of time, work or leisure, the patience of standing in lines, and of course, the cost of conveyance for reaching the polling booth. While the benefits only included the feeling of performing one’s civic duty.
Rational Ignorance
When the costs of acquiring knowledge outweigh the benefits of possessing it, ignorance is rational (Williams, 2021). Downs (1957) famously appealed to rational ignorance to explain the shocking levels of ignorance among voters in contemporary democracies. Because an individual’s vote has a negligible impact on political decision-making, the costs of becoming informed massively outweigh the benefits of being informed. The upshot, argued Downs, is that most voters remain radically and rationally ignorant about matters of fact that would seem to be highly relevant to the issues that they vote on (Downs, 1957).
The majority of the voters might choose not to educate themselves about political candidates, party manifestos, or policy issues because they believe that a single vote is unlikely to make a significant difference in the outcome of an election. The sheer size of the electorate in India, with over 900 million eligible voters, exacerbates this perception. Consequently, voters may find it rational to remain ignorant, as the cost of staying informed — through reading news articles, watching debates, or engaging in discussions — can seem too high compared to the perceived negligible impact of their individual vote.
The result is a populace that may be more susceptible to voting based on superficial factors such as candidate charisma, party loyalty, or populist slogans rather than well-informed decisions based on policy analysis. This rational ignorance contributes to the persistence of the status quo and makes substantial political change more difficult to achieve. The recent case of Uttar Pradesh in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections points towards a similar scenario.
2024 Lok Sabha Elections- The Case of Uttar Pradesh
The case of Uttar Pradesh in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections is one of the good examples to understand the many facets of the psychology of an Indian voter, especially the superficial factors that easily woo the voters. Even though the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) won the Lok Sabha elections, the case of UP turned out to be a twist they never saw coming. Contrary to the predictions of many, even the construction of the Ram Mandir could not ensure the votes for the BJP. Several reports also attributed BJP’s defeat in the state of UP to the narrative advanced by the opposition, in response to their popular slogan “अबकी बार 400 पार” (This time, beyond 400 votes), that if they come to power, they will change the constitution. This popular narrative particularly resonated with the people of backward classes who feared losing their status of reservation. Moreover, Akhilesh Yadav’s spells to make inroads into the non-Yadav OBC votes, paid off (Bureau of Firstpost, 2024). And it is for this very reason, that he fielded only five candidates from the Yadav community — all from his family — in its 62 seats. The party’s landslide victory in the Hindi heartland was greatly attributed to its association with the smaller parties which let them enjoy the best of both worlds, namely, the Yadav community and the non-Yadav OBC community. Interestingly, in an attempt to woo more votes, the SP Chief cleverly modified his “M-Y” or Muslim-Yadav formula to “PDA” or “Pichde (backward classes or OBCs), Dalits, Alpasankhyak (minorities)”. Fortunately for the 2024 Akhilesh-Rahul coalition, a more evolved and mature version of the 2017’s “यूपी के लड़के” (Boys of UP) pitch worked, completely disbanding the Mayawati factor from play. The victory of Dalit leader, Chandrashekar Azad, from the Nagina seat, clearly signalled that the Dalit vote base has started looking for new leadership ('UP Ke Ladke' Works for INDIA, Ram Temple Doesn't for BJP, 2024).
While the BJP-led NDA was sure of a win in Uttar Pradesh, the SP-INC compound was busy spreading the roots of its caste nexus. Even though we read about numerous factors that affect the psychology of voters, for ‘Indian’ voters, nothing comes above their ‘social identity’. In our current scenario, where caste-based vote banks are the bedrock of electoral strategies, Kabir's words, “जाती न पुचो साधु की, पुच लिजिये ज्ञान” (Do not ask the caste of a sadhu, ask for knowledge) would be revolutionary. But let us be realistic: who needs wisdom and knowledge when you can just count on your caste to secure votes?
Conclusion
Understanding the psychology of Indian voter behaviour is akin to solving a profound philosophical problem. It requires unravelling the intricate web of motivations and biases that drive millions to the polling booths. The vast electorate of India presents a grand experiment in democracy, where the sheer diversity of the populace makes every election a complex yet fascinating case study.
While many factors influence voter behaviour – rational analysis of policies, charisma of leaders, and economic promises – it is social identity, particularly caste, that often takes centre stage. Politicians play the caste card masterfully, knowing that the ancient social hierarchy can sway even the most rational of minds. In this grand democratic maze, the Indian voter navigates through a jungle of social identities, weighing the tangible against the intangible. The result is a political landscape where competency and capability often take a backseat to the strong pulls of ‘मज़हब’ और ‘जाति’ (religion and caste). And so, the philosophical challenge remains, to understand an electorate that, despite its complexity, consistently demonstrates that in the grand theatre of democracy, the simplest instincts often prevail.
References
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Williams, D. (2020). Motivated ignorance, rationality, and democratic politics. Synthese, 198(8), 7807-
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The author, Disha Garg is a student at Ramjas College, University of Delhi.
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